Over the last three decades, most Third World cities have experienced rapid growth accompanied by dwindling local and central government resources and management capacities. Traditional approaches to urban planning and administration, such as master plans or ‘blueprints’ for development, did not work and became increasingly obsolete in the 1970s and 1980s. Shortages of public finance and technical capacity within the local and central authorities that were responsible for controlling and directing urban development were exacerbated in the 1990s as the impacts of structural adjustment were felt. Urban planning and management approaches also suffered other shortcomings, including:

• failure to facilitate cross-sectoral co-ordination or inter-departmental and inter-institutional collaboration;
• insufficient mechanisms and tools for substantive participation by community-based stakeholders;
• absence of modalities for collaboration between the public and private sector;
• overemphasis on physical outputs rather than the process for achieving them (Majani 2000).

As a result, unmanaged urban growth, characterised by the poor quality or absence of basic public infrastructure, services, and facilities, increasing environmental degradation, and the depletion of natural resources, is the norm in most cities of the South. Dar es Salaam is no exception. During the same period, the capacity of urban planners to manage rapid urban growth has also declined (Post 1997: 347). Such factors prompted the Prime Minister of Tanzania to dissolve the Dar es Salaam City Council in June 1996 and replace it with a Commission.
(Dar es Salaam City Commission, DCC) of centrally appointed members. Until then, Dar es Salaam had been reasonably independent of central government. However, its powers to collect revenue and make decisions were subject to frequent intervention by central government, meaning that the city government has often been unable to fulfil its obligations to local citizens.

It was in response to these worsening urban management problems and conditions that Habitat (UNCHS), in collaboration with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), developed and began promoting its urban Environmental Planning and Management (EPM) agenda. Underlying the EPM approach is the concern to create a harmonious balance between physical development and the environment in urban settings, and to involve those groups interested in and affected by urban development in seeking solutions to problems that may arise. EPM emphasises the interrelations between and among social actors and environmental issues and thus puts partnership among the key stakeholders at its centre. These partners or stakeholders typically include actors in the public, private, and popular sectors, civil society, and NGOs.

An agreement to adopt the EPM in Dar es Salaam was signed by the government of Tanzania in 1992. That same year, the Sustainable Dar es Salaam Project (SDP) was established, becoming operational in 1993 in order to institutionalise the EPM in the functioning of the City Council. The SDP mandated stakeholders to produce a Strategic Urban Development Plan (SUDP) for the city. This was to be accomplished with substantive inputs from working groups (WGs) composed of ‘informed’ representatives of key stakeholders, including grassroots representatives. Their functions within local government were to be deliberative, consultative, strategic, and mobilisational.

In the EPM scheme, WGs result from stakeholder consultations whose purpose is to identify priority environmental issues at the city, municipal, or town level. In theory, the WGs open up channels for residents to influence decisions and contribute to the management of the city. WGs therefore may be seen as energisers and agents of change in the management style and decision-making processes in local government. They also facilitate and enhance the accountability of public institutions to local citizens.

This article chronicles the functioning, achievements, and failures of two such WGs, one on the management of informal (petty) trading activities and the other on the management of communal open spaces.
Most of the data were collected in interviews with key actors in the respective WGs and with representatives of the main institutions and relevant NGOs. These WGs were chosen from among the nine in existence because they were among the few that had analysed the issues, formulated strategies, and gone on to implement them.

**Description of the EPM working groups**

A city consultation meeting held in 1992 allowed stakeholders to develop a consensus on the priority problems of Dar es Salaam and how to address them. In accordance with EPM protocol, this consultation provided the mandate to establish WGs comprising key actors or stakeholders from public, private, and popular sectors. Each WG was required to prepare an action plan, identify the information/data required and other experts or other actors and institutions to be contacted or involved, and to determine the sessions to be held, and outputs or targets.

The WGs were also mandated to choose chairpersons and co-ordinators. The latter were often appointed from among the SDP technical experts – that is they were persons knowledgeable about EPM – many of whom were officers seconded to the SDP unit from the central government ministries. Members of the WGs were intended to represent the stakeholders and were supposed to be chosen from among senior technical staff who could take decisions on behalf of their institutions. In practice, most institutions appointed less influential officers.

All nine WGs were constituted in response to the priority environmental issues identified. While some DCC councillors became WG members, the day-to-day operations of the SDP unit were run by WG co-ordinators, headed by a project manager or co-ordinator. Initially, Habitat appointed an expatriate technical adviser to set up the unit, but this post was later filled by a local expert. Since its inception in Dar es Salaam, the head of the SDP and now the Urban Authorities Support Unit (UASU) have been appointed from outside the DCC.

From the outset, the SDP has been a separate physical entity with its own assets and management structure. Currently, its only role is to support the institutionalisation of the EPM in three new municipalities in Dar es Salaam. Following a recent government decision to replicate the EPM elsewhere, the UASU has been formed to co-ordinate, monitor, and support this process.
The SDP depends on Habitat and UNDP for financial, logistical, and technical support. Administratively, the SDP and UASU are accountable to the City Council and Ministry of Local Government, respectively. On technical matters, they are largely answerable to Habitat and UNDP: Habitat provides in-house expertise and short-term consultants, and UNDP is the main donor, though it does not fund the WGs’ action plans or projects (see Figure 1).

![Figure 1: Institutional framework for operationalising the EPM in Dar es Salaam City](image-url)

**UNDP**
- Provides financial and logistical support to SDP/UASU

**HABITAT**
- Provides technical support including short term consultants to UASU/SDP
- Monitors EPM operationalisation

**DCC**
- Councillors (until June 1996)
- Commissioners (up to December 2000)
- Approves/adopts strategies and solicits finances to implement WGs’ ideas
- Chairs city consultations

**SDP/UASU**
- Operationalise EPM in Dar es Salaam and other municipalities through WGs
- Answerable to the DCC, Ministry of Local Government, and UNDP
- Monitor performance of all WGs and their co–ordinators
- Mobilise stakeholders including CBOs, and private and public sector actors
- Mobilise resources for executing action plans prepared by WGs

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According to the plans, the participation of the DCC’s functional officers and other technical staff in the WGs would eventually serve to integrate EPM into the routine functions of the DCC. The resulting changes would sustain collaboration between the local authority and other stakeholders in identifying environmental problems and developing and implementing strategies to address them.

Implementing EPM via the working group process

Case study I: management of informal trading activities

The nature of informal (petty) trading activities: The extent, growth rate, and potential inherent in informal trade activities (ITAs) in Tanzania are difficult to quantify because the definition of what constitutes petty or informal trade activities is ambiguous, and local-level opportunities vary widely. However, a study conducted in Dar es Salaam in 1995 estimated that there were about 350,000 informal businesses providing approximately 500,000 jobs (SIDO-GTZ 1995). The 1992 National Informal Sector Survey report estimated that petty trading engaged 64 per cent of the informal business sector in Dar es Salaam and provided employment to over 203,000 people.

The SIDO-GTZ study further showed that more than 90 per cent of these petty traders had no security of tenure to the land on which they were carrying out their activities, i.e. they were largely operating on areas not sanctioned or designated for trading by the local government. Despite this, ITAs have been flourishing and expanding rapidly and include activities such as selling fruit, vegetables, prepared foods, flowers, newspapers, used garments, and petty services. In the absence of permanent premises and security of tenure, most vendors operate from makeshift tables or temporary sheds erected on open spaces or along roadsides. Many inner-city sites, including pedestrian malls and major road junctions, are lined with hawkers. Most vendors are unemployed youth, although mama lishe (women food vendors) are more prominent among those selling food. In general, informal petty business is the employment of last resort for the most economically vulnerable city residents.

The regulation of ITAs has been haphazard, often leading to adverse effects on the traders’ immediate surroundings. These include land-use conflicts and other problems resulting from the improper management of the waste from petty trading, obstruction of traffic movement, trespassing on private or semi-private premises.
(e.g. shopping verandas), etc.. Worse, because informal businesses are largely conducted on premises that have not been sanctioned for such use, some vendors pay exorbitant sums of money to operate there. That such payments usually end up in private pockets rather than in local government coffers (SIDO-GTZ 1995), in part explains the local government’s concern to improve the way in which ITAs are managed.

Local authorities traditionally have a negative perception of informal petty trading, and this attitude has resulted in numerous crackdowns on petty traders by askaris (DCC militia), causing losses, injuries, and forced evictions or round-ups. Yet despite such repression, and even prosecutions, ITAs have grown. Trade liberalisation and low salaries coupled with massive retrenchment, especially in the public sector, have accelerated such growth (Yusuph 2000). The ensuing conflicts and the increasing role that ITAs were playing in the city economy led to this being identified as a priority concern during the city consultation workshop in 1992.

Working group formation and performance: Given the magnitude of the conflicts, the complexity of the trading activities, and the diversity of interests and actors involved, the search for solutions required a multidisciplinary approach. Thus the WG on petty trading comprised 12 stakeholders including VIBINDO (Vikundi vya Biashara Ndogondogo, the Organisation of Small-scale Business Groups), DKOA (Dar es Salaam Kiosk Owners’ Association), and the City Council Departments of Planning, Economy, Trade, and Legal Matters, as well as councillors and Ward Executive Officers, representatives of the key ministries (i.e. Labour and Youth, Trade and Industry), and representatives of important NGOs and government institutions, including SIDO (Small Scale Industries Organisation), GTZ (the German technical co-operation programme), Poverty Africa, and the ILO.

One of the first outcomes from the negotiations, which was carried by the WG in 1994, was the agreement to acknowledge informal (petty) traders as legitimate actors in the city. Thus, their activities would have to be supported by the city’s development planning and management process. To accomplish this, the WG developed three guiding strategies:

- accommodation: support to vendors operating in uncontested areas;
- eviction: expulsion of vendors operating on prohibited or contested sites, including stalls or makeshift tables mounted in front of or within public premises such as school areas and around public office buildings and hospitals;
• relocation: establishment of new market facilities and expansion of existing ones to provide space for resettling petty traders operating in the overcrowded or undesignated areas, particularly in the city centre.

Of these, relocation was the main strategy, primarily because it helped hawkers to remain in their trade. This seems to have been an important precondition for bringing key actors together and forging consensus. This was certainly the case for VIBINDO, which repeatedly had to assure vendors that the WG intended to work with them and solve their problems in order to get their collaboration.

Further consultations and discussions were then conducted with various groups representing vendors and other informal sector operators in the city, to solicit their views, support, and co-operation. Explaining the problems associated with reconciling diverging interests, the WG co-ordinator recalled:

... the most difficult stage during the initial working group sessions was to evolve and agree on a common strategy. Often, differences emerged between vendors’ organisations [e.g. VIDINDO and DKOA] as well as among WG members. It took us a lot of time and effort to come to an agreement.14

Ultimately, a consensus was reached including proposals for relocating vendors at two sites, Makumbusho and Sterio-Temeke. The relocation proposal included a sketch design for market sheds to accommodate vendors, drawn up by an architectural firm in consultation with the WG. Modest fees, to be paid by the vendors to the DCC, were also proposed. The global proposal was then submitted to the DCC for approval and eventual support in mobilising the necessary financial resources.

Unexpectedly, shortly after receiving the proposals, and without consulting the WG, the DCC resolved to evict hawkers from Congo Street, one of their strongholds in the city. This action was taken ostensibly because the street had to be reconstructed, and vendors were required to move to the two sites identified by the WG.15

The DCC then shelved the WG’s proposal for modest market sheds. Through competitive bidding, another private architectural firm won the tender to prepare new design proposals for the market. Without consulting the WG, the firm proposed a modern market complex. This was approved by the DCC and subsequently built.16 Asked why the design that had been generated in consultation with the WG was abandoned, one WG member who worked in the institution that financed the new market proposal responded:
... I was an active member of two WGs, that is the petty trading and traffic management group. Before the City Council was abolished in June 1996, WGs were generally working closely with the various DCC Departments. For instance there were staff from the City Council Departments participating in our WGs. However, when the Commission took up its duties, the link between WGs and the Commission waned. We [the funding agency] only received a notice from the Commission saying that a new design for the market was required because the sketch proposal submitted by the WG did not meet requirements for a ‘modern market’, as it did not provide for cold rooms, butchers, grocers etc.. In order to respect and meet our clients’ needs and interests we floated the tender for competitive bidding. This is the standard procedure we used to award design as well as construction contracts.

Commissioners gave varying reasons on why the WG proposal was not adopted by the DCC. Some observed that:

... the land designated for the relocation of vendors [markets] were prime sites. The Commission therefore decided to put up structures which would reflect the value of the land as well as enhance the visual outlook of the area.

Another commented that:

... what the WG had proposed did not take into account other factors such as options which can generate the desperately needed revenue. The WG was only concerned with the Machinga [hawkers] resettlement problem. This is only one of the problems the Commission was facing.

Asked why they did not consult the WG when the decision to drop its proposal was made, one Commissioner said that the DCC was not obliged to seek WG approval for decisions taken by management. Others said that because the SDP attended the DCC management meetings, it was up to the SDP project manager to inform WG co-ordinators and members of decisions made by the DCC.

The eviction of the hawkers from Congo Street without consulting the WG or taking into account the WG proposals, and the decision to set aside the WG’s design for simple market sheds in favour of very costly structures, challenged the central tenets of the EPM, namely building partnership among stakeholders and ensuring their participation in managing the city’s development. Indeed, the WG seems to have had little or no impact on this process.

The eviction of petty traders provoked skirmishes between the City Council askaris and vendors and led to new invasions by hawkers on
open sites elsewhere. More generally, the DCC’s actions not only demoralised the stakeholders but also increased hostility between the local authority and the vendors.19

Most stakeholders who participated in the WGs expected to obtain some benefit. Vendors expected that through negotiation they would get a better deal, e.g. permanent and safe trading places. Others, such as VIBINDO and DKOA, wanted the city to adopt a more coherent and
supportive approach to the petty trading problem. The DCC, on the other hand, used its powers to ensure the adoption of an option that would above all boost revenue collection as well as improve the cityscape. But because the new Temeke and Makumbusho markets have been abandoned by the vendors (Yusuph 2000), the interests of neither the DCC nor the WG seem to have been met.

Case study II: management of open space

The abuse and misuse of open spaces: The WG on the management of open spaces was also established in response to the 1992 city consultation and became operational in January 1994. It was charged with addressing problems such as:

- illegal occupation or invasion of open spaces;
- legal but dubious subdivision and changes of the use of open spaces by unscrupulous (DCC/MLHSD) officers; and
- underdevelopment and or misuse of open spaces.

The group comprised over 10 institutions and 13 members, including representatives from the local Mtaa (sub-ward) and ward committees, the Ministry of Lands and Human Settlement Development (MLHSD), the National Environmental Council, the National Land Use Commission, the City Council Departments of Planning, Public Works (Parks and Gardens Section), and councillors appointed from the DCC committees. As with other WGs, institutional representatives were to be appointed on the basis of relevant skills, knowledge, or information about the subject in question, and a personal interest in it. A few additional resource persons were invited to join specific sessions. The WG chose to focus on one of the most affected residential areas in the city, namely the planned high-density housing neighbourhoods close to the city centre. Six of the city’s 52 wards were selected, two each from the districts of Kinondoni, Ilala, and Temeke.

Evolving and inaugurating community-based open space management: This WG decided that local community leaders should be commissioned to manage open spaces. Describing how this strategy evolved, the WG co-ordinator said:

We started with visits to the selected wards and Mtaa. We conducted several meetings with Mtaa, Ten cell, and at times Ward Executive Officers. We also had layout maps [scale 1: 2500] covering the areas we visited. During the visits to the wards and Mtaa, the community leaders took us [WG] round to observe the use of the public open spaces in their areas and
It is from the discussions and experiences about the community’s achievements and flaws in trying to check the abuse and misuse of open spaces that the idea to involve local leaders emerged. For instance, from the informal discussions with a ward leader in Mwananyamala Ward, we learnt that [the] Mtaa leader in Kambangwa street in the ward, had filed a case in the court against an unscrupulous builder who invaded and erected a house on community open space.

Later, the observations and views collected during local visits were discussed in WG sessions and incorporated into the strategy that was adopted. However, because the Public Recreation Grounds Ordinance does not mandate communities or private individuals to manage and develop public open spaces, the WG had to seek the DCC’s approval to legalise the proposed arrangement.25

Predictably, community resistance to invasions of recreational open spaces was already the most common response to the problem. Thus, the WG’s strategy of empowering the local community to play a meaningful role in the development and management of open spaces did not require much mobilisation or extended negotiations with grassroots leaders. However, a contract had to be drawn up to define roles, stipulate conditions, and, most importantly, formalise agreements between the local government and the respective community leaders, corporate bodies, or private individuals, as necessary.26

Apart from formulating this contract, the WG also initiated an awareness-creation campaign that aimed to mobilise support from residents. This involved the Commission, the three City District Commissioners, ward, and Mtaa leaders. According to WG co-ordinators, local community leaders were excited and enthusiastic about the new approach these campaigns proclaimed. Many of them felt that gradually their role in the city management process was being acknowledged.

Marked improvements have been made in the wards where community leaders and private companies were contracted to develop and manage open spaces. For instance, communities in Mwananyamala, Ward 14 Temeke, Makurumla, and Ilala wards have taken initiatives not only to protect open spaces against invaders but also to develop them by planting trees, providing leisure facilities, and undertaking routine cleaning. This approach has tapped resources from private companies to improve open spaces in other areas such as Mnazi Mmoja, Mwananyamala B, and Temeke Wailesi. Furthermore, several private companies have sought DCC consent to manage and develop...
areas such as Biafra open space along Kawawa Road in Kinondoni, a playground at Namanga shopping area, Oyster Bay beach area, and Mbagala Kibonde Maji open space in Mbagala Ward. These initiatives suggest that the community and private sector are willing to collaborate with the public sector in order to supplement the latter’s weaknesses.

These positive developments must be set against less positive trends, which most notably include the DCC’s waning commitment to integrating the WGs in its routine functions. Grassroots actors’ enthusiasm for and contributions to the management of open spaces has also declined. This is attributed to a number of factors, chief among them the DCC’s failure to honour the agreement to delegate management of open spaces to local community leaders. Local leaders in Sinza, Buguruni, and Magomeni Wards complain that zonal or city authorities have not responded effectively to their request to restrain invasion or encroachment on open spaces. They also complain that invaders often collude with officials at the DCC or the MLHSD. The officials change the use of open spaces without consulting community leaders,
suggesting that the officers responsible have vested interests. There have also been instances of Mtaa leaders attempting to evict invaders from open spaces, only to be restrained from doing so by the DCC. Working group co-ordinators claim that their attempts to follow up appeals forwarded to the DCC by ward and Mtaa leaders often received a cold response, signalling the institution’s unwillingness to cooperate. In other words, despite the proclaimed intention of involving local community leaders to play active roles in the management and development of open spaces, and the exemplary results from the pilot wards, some DCC bureaucrats have continued to operate as if nothing had changed, or as if community leaders or WG roles do not much matter.

The DCC’s insensitivity to proposals and appeals for support from community leaders has demoralised and weakened the WG members, particularly the local representatives. This, coupled with lack of logistical support to facilitate WG sessions, seems to have undermined the partnership spirit of the EPM approach. Owing (among other things) to ‘vested interests’, the belief that roundtable ‘consensus’ reached through the EPM would push those in powerful or decision-making positions to adopt and support partnership with stakeholders, is in jeopardy. Discussing the rise and fall of government–community partnership for urban development in Sri Lanka, Vidler and Russell (2000: 85) caution that entrenched government institutions and power structures could undermine sustainable partnership. This observation may also explain the flagging nature of the collaboration between DCC, bureaucrats, and local communities in enhancing the management of open spaces in Dar es Salaam.

**An overview of past and recent trends of the working groups**

The overall performance and extent to which WGs were deployed in the decision-making processes and resolution of environmental problems in the city since the inception of the EPM is outlined below. This account is based on interviews with 18 individuals, among them SDP co-ordinators, WG members, heads of DCC departments, as well as three City Commissioners and two former DCC councillors.

Overall, the DCC has benefited from the innovative strategies developed by the WGs, particularly in relation to the improvement of solid waste collection, the establishment of a city-wide Geographic Information System (GIS) Unit, traffic management in the city centre,
and partnership arrangements for improving basic infrastructure in informal housing. However, while the DCC has implemented a number of WG proposals, these have mainly been those that contributed to accomplishing its own short-term agenda. It would appear that it has been one thing to access or implement proposals from WGs, but quite another for the DCC to take steps to change working norms for routine urban planning and management functions. As depicted in Figure 4, WGs were deployed increasingly between 1991 and 1996, but this trend declined in early 1997.

The nature of activities and conditions that contributed to the rise and fall of their deployment are also shown. As we have already seen, the general observation is that during the City Council’s period, WGs were generally extensively deployed, but much less so during the Commission’s era.

**The working group approach: lessons and challenges**

It may be too early to assess the degree of institutionalisation or extent of reforms that the EPM approach has contributed to the routine planning and management systems of the City Council. It is also difficult to generalise from the achievements and flaws observed to date. However, the evidence suggests that unless the challenges which have arisen in the course of implementing the two EPM programmes are addressed, the sustainability of the concept in reforming planning and management in Tanzania will be jeopardised.

This is not to question the need for an alternative planning and management approach or to suggest that its implementation ought to have been a straightforward task. In fact, because the implementation of EPM inevitably involves cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional issues, as well as a multitude of institutions and actors, achieving a breakthrough in reforming urban management and planning practices is likely to take time. However, it is worth recapitulating those factors which have adversely affected implementation of the EPM so that we can build upon the experiences of Dar es Salaam.

**Insensitive culture of governance and transition from City Council to Commission**

The EPM approach encourages partnership between local government institutions and other stakeholders in urban development. At the centre of this partnership is the question of power-sharing between the local government officers and other stakeholders. But without any legal
Institutionalising the concept of environmental planning and management

Figure 4: The deployment of working groups, 1992–2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Intensity of working group activities</th>
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<td>1991</td>
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- New project, enthusiasm from many
- Financial resources available (UNDP/Habitat)
- Political support/assistance from PM and DCC – high expectations
- Stakeholders keen to see solution to environmental problems
- Many ongoing activities including environmental profile accomplished
- Motivated coordinators

- Pilot projects implemented
- Many action plans and bankable projects formulated
- Awareness-creation and training sessions held
- Well-informed and motivated WGs coordinators

- End of financial support (from UNDP) to WGs and coordinators
- DCC not keen on the SDP/WGs
- Limited WG meetings, mainly DCC coordinators (insufficiently trained) working with the SDP
- Replication diverts focus from DSM to other municipalities
- SUDP generation period, fewer people involved
- Under-estimation of grassroots leaders
- Action plans prepared but not implemented; WGs demoralised

or structural position in local government, WGs essentially act like voluntary pressure groups. Local government officials ask ‘Who are these WGs, with whom we must share decision-making powers?’ The situation in Dar es Salaam was further compounded by the replacement in 1996 of the elected council with a team of bureaucrats (commissioners) appointed by central government. This seems to have short-circuited local democratisation processes, especially the participation of stakeholders and representatives of civil society in the management of city affairs which, in turn, seems to have made it harder for the EPM to be institutionalised.29
The ongoing process of democratisation in Tanzania, including political pluralism, local government reforms, and calls for more transparency in the dealings of the public sector, are yet to have any significant impact on the management style of local governments. Discussing how centralised power and decision making in the DCC Chairman has affected solid waste management in the city, Majani (2000) asserts that the lack of delegation led to higher transaction costs. For instance, decisions were often delayed or could only be made after the DCC Chairman had sanctioned them.30

Emphasising the omnipotence of the City Commission, Majani further notes that the practice at DCC was ‘... what has not been seen (i.e. sanctioned) by the Chairman has not been seen by the Commission’. Suffice it to say that the climate at the DCC was not conducive to empowering functional officers to take decisions. It is no wonder actors from outside the DCC, such as WGs and community leaders, faced obstacles in their path as they tried to influence decision-making processes.

**Immature transition to multi-party democracy**

The adoption of participatory urban planning and management is taking place at the advent of multi-party democracy in Tanzania. The EPM concept and multi-party democracy ought to be mutually reinforcing, yet this does not seem to be the case. Multi-party democracy is new and has yet to mature. And, as all plans are ultimately political statements and all attempts to implement them are political acts (Rondinelli 1983), partisan politics in the context of multi-party competition may even be slowing the implementation of EPM, as bureaucrats may distrust WG members because of their affiliation to certain (opposition) parties.31 This tends to reinforce traditional administrative centralism that is so dominant among some local government bureaucrats and especially in an unelected local council and that disregards other parts of the urban administration and is insensitive to the ‘principle of subsidiarity’. This context seems to have been one of the main constraints on institutionalising the EPM in Dar es Salaam (Majani 2000).

**Frequent change of top leadership and priorities**

The frequent change of the chief executives of the DCC – six in eight years – adversely affected the process of institutionalising the EPM. Every time a new city executive was appointed, the SDP had to re-establish links with the new leadership, and had to make repeated
efforts to gain each successive executive’s support for the EPM approach. In addition, because of lack of continuity in the DCC administration, a number of training sessions had to be held to inform new incumbents about the new city management and planning concept.

Since the EPM was adopted in Dar es Salaam, the city authorities, including the mayor and later the DCC Chairman, have repeatedly made public statements in support of fully incorporating EPM into the city management system. These statements were seldom backed by action. For instance, none of the proposals submitted to the City Council or Commission seeking a financial contribution to facilitate WG sessions was granted, despite numerous promises (Kombe 1999b).

The change of priorities, and especially the expectation of immediate outputs, during the Commission tenure seems to have undermined the adoption of the EPM within the DCC. Discussing the criteria for evaluating the ability to implement plans, Rakodi and Devas (1993: 60) caution that those in power have somehow to accept them. Although the DCC was interested and did sometimes use WG outputs, at the same time it seemed reluctant to address the constraints to the generation and flow of outputs. In the end, the low priority given to the SDP is reflected in the government’s failure to meet its pledge to provide matching funds for the national sustainable cities programme over the 1996–2000 period. By May 2000, only US$75,000 of the promised US$1,200,000 had materialised (Burian 2000).

Furthermore, priorities and decisions during the DCC’s term largely focused on areas where quick results could be obtained. By and large, the City Commission tended to adopt WGs’ contributions only if these fitted into and/or gave immediate tangible outputs. Thus, in the months following the formation of the City Commission, the WGs started to wither, as did the relationship between the DCC and the SDP (depicted in Figure 4).32

Overemphasis on physical outputs, and insufficient knowledge
In Tanzania, where the tradition of master planning remains influential, the term ‘project’ is largely understood to mean the construction of infrastructure and the like. Thus, when the SDP was established, many at the DCC assumed that it was a project along the lines of sites and service or squatter improvement initiatives, and they expected the SDP to channel funds to tackle problems such as poor roads, lack of storm water drains, the lack of trucks for emptying cesspits, or insufficient...
housing plots. Changing that perception among councillors and bureaucrats took time. According to an SDP co-ordinator, ‘Often it has been difficult to get support from some of the commissioners because they perceived the EPM as a project that ought to fund development programmes of the DCC. When funds for such purposes were not forthcoming, many bureaucrats lost interest.’

These misconceptions about the SDP and the EPM approach, how it should operate, and what its outputs should be persist among some officials to this day. Unless those who are expected to put the EPM into practice truly understand its aims, the sustainability and institutionalisation of the approach are likely to founder.

Semi-autonomous status of the SDP

The EPM in Dar es Salaam is handicapped by the fact that the agent of change, the SDP, was established as a semi-autonomous unit outside the DCC. This caused various problems, including weak communication between the staff of the two bodies. The physical separation between the SDP and the DCC, coupled with the comparatively better remuneration and working environment enjoyed by the generally more junior SDP staff, also fostered some ill-will and so hampered working relationships that could have facilitated the adoption of the EPM norms in the routine operations of the DCC. This was exacerbated by the fact that all project managers and co-ordinators were appointed from outside the DCC. Former SDP co-ordinators noted ‘... the EPM concept seems to have been over-mystified. Throughout its existence the head has been appointed from outside the DCC, and not from among us. We do not know why.’ Since all project managers and co-ordinators were appointed on merit, such remarks probably represent petty grudges. But the underlying message is clear.

Elitism and distrust of working groups

The EPM approach requires bureaucrats and politicians to be open and responsive to ideas from stakeholders. But while DCC departments were represented in the WGs, the experiences recounted in the case studies above show that DCC officials typically received proposals from the WGs with reservation, if not outright scorn. The VIBINDO Executive Secretary noted:

> Both the former City Council and the Commission have done little to solve the Machinga [hawkers] problem except to harass them and evict them. They believe they have solutions to problems even when their actions do not
work. They cannot provide employment to the youth, but they destroy their initiatives. The major problem is that the relationship between City Council or Commission and us [non-council persons] is poor. They think we [VIBINDO] are lay-persons and thus have no [skills] or good ideas, which can address local problems. They ignore us because they think we cannot speak the same language.\textsuperscript{37}

It is no surprise that views and ideas from below are looked down on by those in power. Bureaucrats often tend to treat people from outside the local government system as uninformed lay-persons who cannot make meaningful contributions towards solving community problems (Kombe 1995). Such attitudes may frustrate the establishment of partnerships with private and community actors, and undermine the EPM approach.

**Conclusion and recommendations**

- EPM implies cross-sectoral co-ordination and consensus-building among many stakeholders often with diverse interests. It must, therefore, proceed slowly. If it takes too long to deliver tangible outputs, the approach is likely to be criticised by those who expect fast results. Indeed, its time-consuming nature may imply costs that stakeholders are unwilling to pay. Some stakeholders may well abandon the approach in favour of existing, though often unsustainable, fast-track options. It is therefore essential that WGs become more efficient and output oriented. This may be accomplished initially by choosing smaller pilot study areas where the pressing environmental issues require strategic inputs from WG stakeholders. The WGs should not attempt, however, to manage routine local government tasks.

- Changing power relationships and norms, rules, and procedures is a slow and complex process, particularly because self-interest may inhibit such changes. To consolidate the radical changes in the local institutional setting envisaged by the EPM will take time, endurance, and ongoing nurturing of the approach, as well as tolerance on all sides.

- The present role and position of WGs in local government is ambiguous, since they have neither a statutory nor a structural position in the administration. Their position as an operational arm of the EPM should be defined, including a mechanism to convey feedback from the local authority to the WG members. While WGs
ought to facilitate partnerships, they should be dissolved once their specific tasks are accomplished and not become permanent structures within the local government. However, the institutional framework for deploying and responding to WGs should be developed at all levels of urban governance.

- Local governments should play a leading role in implementing the EPM, particularly by convening WG sessions. Local government is in a position to foster confidence in the WGs among local bureaucrats, increase WG accountability to local government, and mitigate or eradicate the power-sharing problem. Organised local communities, including those at the ward and *Mtaa* level should be assisted to adopt and form their own WGs to link with those operating at the local government level.

- Sustained partnership requires that all parties share benefits as well as costs. This is important in order to help establish a recognition of (monetary) value of the WGs’ outputs as well as fostering their accountability to the local authorities.

The shift from bureaucratically controlled to substantive stakeholder participation in urban planning and management can improve the handling of problems facing our cities and towns, whether through mobilising resources or in order to promote environmentally friendly urban settlements. The EPM’s impacts on and contribution to sustainable development in Dar es Salaam are already being felt in the gradual adoption of multi-sectoral approaches to planning and management in the City Council; the implementation of an effective traffic management system; the training of central and local government staff as well as community (civil society) leaders in the three municipalities; and the increased participation of residents (both community members and professionals) in urban governance.

So far, the UASU has concentrated on the nine new municipalities and the city of Dar es Salaam. Little has been done to support, build capacity, and put in place a policy and legislative framework for monitoring long-term replication and implementation of the EPM process elsewhere in Tanzania. In addition to the recommendations above, the future prospects of EPM in the country also hinge on the ability to explore and build the capacity to propagate and monitor the adoption of the EPM at a pace that meets the anticipated demand nationwide. This will happen only if the key ministries responsible for urban development management and planning, as well as key training
institutions in the country, are fully involved in promoting the EPM strategy.

Notes

1 Most DCC bureaucrats are appointees of the council; commissioners are appointees of the central government. Local communities in the wards elect councillors, who often have different socio-economic or training backgrounds from those of the commissioners or DCC bureaucrats.

2 UNCHS (Habitat) and UNEP launched the Sustainable Cities Programme (SCP) in August 1990, as part of the Urban Management Programme. Its main goal is to ensure that fast-growing cities and towns remain economically, socially, and environmentally sustainable. For more details see SCP Source Book Series, Habitat/UNEP; see also UNCHS 1995, 1997.

3 Institutionalisation here refers to a process whereby the participatory principles and instruments inherent in the EPM approach are adopted in the routine decision-making process. This implies that EPM norms become stable and legitimate within local government structures.

4 ‘Informed’ in the sense that the selection of stakeholders’ representative groups is inter alia made from persons with knowledge of, and interest in, the specific environmental issue of concern.

5 The emphasis on partnership primarily arose from the increasing acknowledgement of the fact that neither the central, local government, popular sector, donor communities, nor private sector alone has sufficient wherewithal to address problems posed by unprecedented urban population growth.

6 Priority environmental issues which were identified and agreed upon are: solid waste management, liquid waste management, air quality management and urban transportation, open space management and urban agriculture. Others are upgrading unplanned and unserviced settlements, managing urban expansion, managing urban renewal, managing coastal resources and managing the urban economy and integrating petty trading in the urban economy.

7 SDP co-ordinators or project managers were appointed on merit by a panel constituted of officers from the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Administration, the city (Commission) council and Habitat.

8 UASU, like SDP, continues to operate as a separate entity and maintains a financial accounting and management system separate from that of the local governments it supports.

9 Management of informal activities or businesses entailed organising the actors and their activities, providing premises, and formalising their operations by registering them and issuing licences.

10 Petty trading is a part of the informal sector operations. It is estimated that the informal sector could employ about 65 per cent of the annual increase in the labour force while the formal sector can absorb only 8.5 per cent (URT 1997).

11 Some activities including vegetable and food vending as well as service activities such as carpentry, garages, and tailoring have fixed premises.
but these have often not been sanctioned by the local government.

12 The location of informal (petty) trading in the city is often influenced by the expected flow of buyers from surrounding areas.

13 For instance, it is estimated that forced eviction of petty traders in Congo Street in Dar es Salaam City resulted in a loss of over 30,000 businesses and property worth more than TShs 500 million (SIDO-GTZ 1995).

14 Discussion with Anna Mtani on 26 March 2000.

15 Discussion with the WG Co-ordinators and a former head of the DCC department.

16 The reported cost of building the Sterio-Temeke market was TShs 480 million (US$600,000).

17 Interviews conducted with some of the former DCC commissioners and the programme officer for the organisation which financed the design construction of the two markets, the National Income Generation Programme (NIGP), invariably argued that this was a decision by the DCC management.

18 The respondents preferred to remain anonymous.

19 In a discussion with Mr Michael (WG Co-ordinator) on 24 March 2000 and VIBINDO Secretary General on 28 March 2000, both asserted that WG morale deteriorated sharply and animosity between vendors and the DCC followed the DCC’s decision.

20 Discussions with VIBINDO Secretary General and Chairman, 28 March 2000.

21 Yusuph (2000) reports that because of the high charges levied on the stalls erected at Temeke Street market, vendors have abandoned the stalls. Meanwhile, the government-owned newspaper, The Daily News (5 June 2000) characterised Makumbusho market as ‘A sleeping giant’ and reported that despite the call on petty traders (Machingas) by the President of Tanzania on 26 September 1997 to make full use of it, the complex remained sparsely occupied with only 65 of 350 stalls being used. This market complex is reported to have cost TShs 370 million (US$500,000).

22 Mtaa, or sub-ward, is the smallest administrative unit of local government and comprises several Ten Cell Units or agglomerations of ten houses (though in practice the number varies from eight to 15 dwellings).

23 For instance, during some of the WG sessions, local leaders (Mtaa and Ten Cell leaders) who had been involved in initiatives to protect and monitor the use of open space in their respective areas were invited to share their experiences with the WG members. Some architects from private and public offices in the city were also invited.

24 The selected wards were Mwananyamala and Makurumla; Ilala and Tabata; Ward 14 and Mbagala; in Kinondoni, Ilala, and Temeke Districts, respectively.

25 The amendment was effected through Government Notice No. 167, 1994.

26 The signatories to the contract include the City Chairman, the Solicitor, the respective ward and Mtaa leaders and the corporate body, or private individual as the case may be.

27 This refers to, for instance, changes of communal open spaces in Block A in Sinza and invasion of a school plot in Magomeni.


29 Primarily because the grassroots, including wards, were not represented in the Commission.
In a discussion between the author and those who have been closely involved in the EPM promotion activities in Dar es Salaam and elsewhere in Tanzania, they suggested that the strong mandate given to the Commission, and overall management style, contradicted the EPM spirit (personal communication from B.B.K. Majani, A.G. Kyessi, and T.J. Nnkya).

This may happen despite the fact that national legislation requires that civil servants remain non-partisan in executing their duties.

Majani and Halla (1999), discussing solid waste management in Dar es Salaam, reiterate this, noting that one of the pitfalls of the City Commission is that it focuses on short-term results. Initially the Commission term was only one year; later it was extended by two more years.

This includes interpersonal clashes between the DCC bureaucrats and the SDP staff (personal communications from Dr Burian (UASU Co-ordinator), Mr Lubuva (former City Commission Secretary, now Ilala Municipal Director), and Mr Salewi (Engineer, National Income Generation Programme [NIGP]).

SDP co-ordinators felt that some of the DCC bureaucrats were resentful of the SDP staff because the latter enjoyed better working conditions, despite being junior to them, views echoed by some of the former heads of departments interviewed.

The respondents wished to remain anonymous.

The fact that the current generation of bureaucrats in the local government system was largely trained and employed before the EPM was adopted might inhibit the adoption of changed working practices, while some bureaucrats may shy away because of ignorance about the EPM.

Discussion with the VIBINDO Secretary General, Gaston Kikuwi, 28 March 2000.

References


Majani, B. (2000) ‘Institutionalising Environmental Planning and Management: The Case of Solid Waste Management in Dar es Salaam’, doctoral research, University of Dortmund


